As shown in this Japanese language news movie, Mishima harangued the assemble troops of the Ichigaya headquarters and encouraged them to rise up against the elected government, march on the Diet and overthrow the elected government, and reinstate the Emperor as the supreme authority in Japan. The reasons cited were primarily due to the cultural and spiritual enervation of Japan and its opening to western influences, including communism. The troops were unresponsive, in some cases jeering, and ignoring his traditionally written manifesto which was hung from the balcony. Consequently, Mishima returned inside, and a while later committed seppuku. The first of his followers designated as his second failed in three attempts to take the finishing blow to sever his head from his body; another had to take over and finish the job, and then also provided the task of second for the first of his seconds, who then also committed seppuku. The remaining three members of the Tatenokai on the site of Ichigaya then surrendered, and the incident, it appeared, was over.
Over time various attempts at explaining Mishima's action--from dismissing it as the neurotic, overblown melodrama of a 'homosexualist', to ascribing it to his guilt over being too sickly for service in WW2--have tried suggest his actions were ultimately the result of some form of psychological problems, without any actual serious attempt to overthrow the government. Recently, however, I have noticed evidence which calls this interpretation of events into light, and gives tantalizing hope of the release of further British government archival documents which may reveal the degree of GSDF complicitcy and involvement in the 25 November Incident. Before going on to this evidence it should be noted that it is already established fact that the Tatenokai was trained and equipped by the GSDF, on GSDF military facilities, with their full collaboration. They were in no sense an illegal group nor were they disapproved of by the heads of the Army.
Indeed, the British government did in fact have intelligence which seemed to suggest a more far-reaching intent on the part of the GSDF:
2001 Japan Times article covering the release of some of this information.
The commanding general of the GSDF in Kyushu had made frank remarks regaining frustration with civilian control of the military.Wednesday, Jan. 3, 2001
Britain feared a revival of militarism after Mishima's suicide
By YASUSHI FUNATSU
Kyodo News
LONDON -- The dramatic suicide by Japanese writer and nationalist Yukio Mishima after his failed attempt to foment a coup in 1970 triggered British concern about a revival of militarism in Japan, according to 30-year-old declassified British documents released on New Year's Day.
The papers, dispatched by the British Embassy in Tokyo immediately after Mishima's death to the Foreign and Defense ministries in London, pointed to Mishima's appeal against the Nonproliferation Treaty, which took effect only eight months before his failed effort to stage a coup.
"The most interesting part of (Mishima's) appeal may be the reference to the Nonproliferation Treaty," the embassy wrote in one of the documents, suggesting a close watch be kept on how rightists reacted to the treaty.
The embassy noted that the NPT was perceived by some Japanese as being equivalent to a prewar treaty that had given the U.S. and British navies a fixed size advantage over Japan's.
In the afternoon of Nov. 25, 1970, Mishima -- heading a group of four followers -- committed ritual harakiri and was subsequently beheaded by one of his young colleagues, ending his life at 45 at the Ground Self-Defense Force Eastern Army Headquarters in Ichigaya, Tokyo.
Mishima killed himself after making an unsuccessful plea to the Self-Defense Forces to take action to shake off the constitutional constraints on the SDF and re-establish the prewar spiritual virtues of self-sacrifice for the Emperor and country.
Another document revealed that the commanding general of the GSDF in Kyushu had made "frank remarks about military frustration with civilian control" shortly before the Mishima incident in the presence of Lt. Gen. Kanetoshi Mashita, commanding general of the Eastern Army, who knew Mishima well.
Mashita was taken hostage when Mishima and his four young disciples of the Tate no Kai (Shield Society), a paramilitary organization he led, managed to enter the Eastern Army Headquarters.
Mishima established himself as a highly acclaimed novelist with the publication of highbrow novels such as "Confession of a Mask" and "The Golden Pavilion."
He was also a candidate for the Nobel Prize in literature, but failed to win because -- many believe -- he was too young.
In his ultranationalistic appeal, Mishima said, "Where is the samurai's soul? Where are you, a colossal arsenal without soul, going? There were some businessmen who called the government's politicians traitors after the textile negotiations (with the United States). However, since the NPT was related to the grand strategy for the nation and it was obviously the reproduction of the prewar unequal treaty (with Britain and the U.S.), there appeared no SDF general who committed ritual suicide in protest."
An embassy document dispatched Dec. 1, 1970, paid special attention to these remarks, saying, "It is not unusual for many Japanese in conversation to compare the NPT with the naval agreements of the interwar years as perpetuating Japanese inferiority."
The naval disarmament treaty signed at a conference in Washington in 1921 put the ratio for major warships for Britain, the U.S. and Japan at 5:5:3. The treaty caused frustration among Japanese naval officers committed to expansionism.
Note that carefully, because it ties into another buried fact of 25 November Incident. It is usually said that the rest of the Tatenokai except for Mishima's handpicked four men didn't even know about the attack; but this is a factual lie, something which is repeated in the western media but known to be false because Mishima's own manifesto on the banner he unfurled containing his demands directly contradicts it in the original Japanese.
It's just hard to find copies of it, but here a summary of the demands are kindly repeated:
1.
All personnel at the Ichigaya base should assemble in the courtyard to listen to Mishima's speech.
2.
Remaining members of the Tate-no-Kai, who had been waiting in reserve at nearby Ichigaya Hall, were to be called to the main building at the GSDF garrison.
3.
Any attack on the Mishima group was not to be launched before 1:10 P. M. (Thereby giving them at least two hours to incite the GSDP Force soldiers to joining Mishima in a coup d'etat.)
4.
No obstruction of any kind was to be made against the Society of the Shield forces before 1:10 p. m.
5.
Mishima promised to spare the life of General Masuda, even if the commandant wished to commit hara-kiri ritual suicide, if the first four demands were met.
6.
If the demands were not met, or there were indications that they would not be met, Mishima would immediately kill the general and himself.
The rest of the Tatenokai was in fact waiting in reserve to be trucked to the main headquarters at Ichigaya. So in fact the entirety of the paramilitary organization had been concentrated for this operation. The fact that they refused the manoeuvre does not imply as is commonly assumed that they were unaware of it; and they were certainly aware of something.
Now there are two final points which bears consideration, and brings the tantalizing possibility together in this little historical drama which has been so thoroughly papered-over:
The first of these is that the Japanese military involvement with Mishima was much more than is commonly thought, beyond just training:
In short, Mishima's intention to stage a coup was known by officers of the GSDF, and absolutely nothing was done to preempt him. If officers unconnected with his Tatenokai were aware, then the concentration of resources for a coup is already a rather more plausible thing. This was not an action confined to only five men. And there are good reasons for this. Let's go back to that general who commanded to the Western Army on Kyushu, shall we?The first book came out in 2001. A retired high-ranking intelligence officer wrote about his relationship with the late writer Yukio Mishima.
Written by a former high-ranking officer at the Ground SDF intelligence school in Kodaira, Tokyo, the memoir described how intelligence training was provided to Mishima and his private militia, Tate-no-kai (Shield Society). The retired officer wrote that Mishima confided in him about his plans to stage a coup d'etat on Nov. 25, 1970, a protest that ended with Mishima's ritual suicide by disembowelment and beheading at the headquarters of the Ground SDF eastern command in Tokyo's Ichigaya district.
Mishima's masterpieces include "Confessions of a Mask," "Temple of the Golden Pavilion" and "Patriotism."
The retired officer said he wrote his book because he wanted to convey Mishima's true thoughts about national defense.
This article provides more, and relevant, detail about the actions of Lt. Gen. Masayasu Kohzuma, commander of the Western Army on Kyushu, and the fellow we have quoted above making "frank remarks about military frustration with civilian control" .
So Kohzuma's troops were engaged in exercises on the exact day of the 25 November Incident, and the man, on the record as criticizing civilian control in the presence of General Mashita, said he consulted other senior officers on whether or not he should "rush to Tokyo or mobilize his forces to deal with the emergency". Note that he does not say suppress Mishima or respond to the coup but simply "deal with the emergency".nother document sent by military attache Col. P.H. Hislop on the day after Mishima's suicide quoted remarks by Lt. Gen. Masayasu Kohzuma, commander of the Western Army, against civilian control.
Hislop also reported that Kohzuma had criticized Yasuhiro Nakasone, the then director general of the Defense Agency and later prime minister, and said that Japanese officers should be allowed to carry swords again as they had in the Imperial Japanese Army before the end of the war.
''Gen. Kohzuma must have felt confident that his views were shared, otherwise he would surely not have expressed them to me in the presence of Gen. Mashita and two of his own senior staff officers,'' Hislop wrote, suggesting he believed frustration was widespread in the SDF.
Hislop said he was interested in Gen. Kohzuma's remarks especially because he was a ''quiet, intelligent, aristocratic looking Japanese...one who appears to pick his words with care.''
In a telephone interview with Kyodo News in Tokyo, Kohzuma, now retired and 86 years old, admitted he had criticized civilian control in the presence of Gen. Mashita days before Mishima burst into the Eastern Army Headquarters but said he did not remember the British military attache.
Kohzuma added that Mishima's failed coup occurred while his troops were engaging in exercises and that he had consulted with other senior officers about whether he should rush to Tokyo or mobilize his forces to deal with the emergency.
Let's go back to our prior source on Mishima's demands, and note one final component:
So the entirety of the cabinet and the Diet were assembled in an extraordinary session only several blocks away: The perfect target for a decapitation operation against the civilian Japanese government. And now we see that we have Lieutenant General Kohzuma leading his army on manoeuvres--his army on Kyushu which should have no business responding to an emergency in Eastern Army theatre of operations--and "discussing with his officers" whether or not to rush to the capitol and "intervene". And we know that officers in the JSDF military intelligence forces had advanced knowledge that Mishima intended to launch a coup attempt, and did nothing.It happened while Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, a few blocks away, was addressing the opening of an extraordinary session of the Diet.
The result is a powerful concentration of circumstantial evidence that suggests that the 25 November Incident was far more than just the hysterics of one man, and indeed, Mishima may instead have played the role of a test case, if Mashita refused to join in Kohzuma and Mishima's plot, in this theory, then the assault in the Ishigaya Headquarters was an attempt to rally the GSDF to the banner of a militaristic coup, and assualt and decapitate the Diet and civilian leadership in one stroke during the extraordinary session held that day. The Western Army then on manoeuvres would be well-placed under Kohzuma to take advantage of the situation, and establish military government. So the circumstantial evidence seems to in fact raise as a possibility. But the failure of Mishima's attempt to rouse the garrison at Ishigaya to his side meant that Kohzuma backed down and instead masked his own preparations under the guise of army manoeuvres and a consideration of the prospect of an intervention thus intended for people to naturally assume it was to be an intervention against Mishima rather than the one that Kohzuma's own statements make seem more likely--that he might well have intended to intervene to support Mishima, and indeed that the 25 November Incident was an attempt at a militarist coup in Japan which collapsed when it became clear that the common soldiers in the GSDF would turn against their own officers rather than obey in the suppression of the Diet and ending of civilian government.
Some notes behind this: The whole development of the 25 November Incident, when looked at critically, is an interesting and rather chilling development of Japanese postwar politics that has been thoroughly overlooked, and my thoughts on the matter came about from reflecting on this evidence, and on the fact that Mishima's second failed so thoroughly in three attempts to remove his head in seppuku, which is a very botched job and quite rare in Japanese history. For someone who supposedly rigorously planned the act for years, it makes little sense... Unless the main goal was never seppuku all along, but instead actually the coup succeeding, and it was strictly a backup, a gesture of honour and redemption, should the coup attempt fail as it did. That much more neatly explains the failure of Mishima's second, and then of course it congeals behind this quietly considerable body of circumstantial evidence which suggests that something greater than just a melodramatic stage suicide was actually taking place.
The fact that the coup failed from the bottom, though, speaks a great deal to just how much Japanese society really had already changed, but it also shows to what extent that the Japanese leadership, especially military in the JSDF, were still very much the same men who had participated in the atrocities and warfare of Imperial Japan in WW2. It is in light of that, and the extensive body of evidence suggesting that the act was part of a botched, but serious, coup attempt by elements of the GSDF, that I chose the title for the thread, and a more realistic name for the event should it ever be given the serious historical attention it deserves as the 25 November Incident, directly reminiscent of the interwar period Japanese political coups.
